A recent case from the 2^nd District in Ohio highlights search and seizure law as it pertains to a house in Ohio and the attenuation doctrine. The case, State v. Turpin, began when an officer from the Dayton Police Department received a dispatch to a residence on Haverfield Road in Dayton in response to a recovered stolen vehicle.

Dispatch reported a suspect, James Delecce, and that an active warrant existed for his arrest. Turpin resided at the Haverfield Road location; Delecce did not. The officer arrived and found the stolen vehicle in the driveway. The vehicle-owner’s mother arrived shortly thereafter and told the officer that she received a phone call from the Haverfield Road residence informing her that the vehicle would be found there.

The vehicle was unoccupied, so the officer decided to see if anyone was home at the Haverfield Road address. After knocking on the door and shouting, the officer entered the home and found Turpin sleeping. The officer observed two syringes next to Turpin and believed that Turpin had recently used heroin. Turpin woke up and identified himself, and the officer discovered an active warrant for Turpin. Turpin was arrested.

Motion to Suppress

Turpin’s attorney filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the officer’s warrantless search of his residence. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress.

The trial court stated that although the warrantless entry was a violation of Turpin’s constitutional rights, the “existence of a preexisting warrant was an intervening circumstance that interrupted the connection between the unconstitutional police conduct and the discovery of the evidence.”

Turpin appealed the decision to the 2^nd District Court of Appeals.

Attenuation Doctrine

In his appeal, Turpin argued that the trial court erred by applying the attenuation doctrine to “primary evidence” that was “seized as a direct result” of the warrantless search of his residence. The attenuation doctrine only applies to “derivative evidence.”

Furthermore, Turpin argued that regardless of whether the evidence was primary or derivative, the discovery of an active arrest warrant was not an “intervening circumstance” for purposes of the attenuation doctrine.

The State argued that the initial entry into Turpin’s residence did not violate Turpin’s constitutional rights and, even if the entry was not constitutionally permissible, the attenuation doctrine applied.

Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

Before discussing the attenuation doctrine or the distinction between “primary” and “derivative” evidence, we must first understand what the Fourth Amendment states in regards to searches and seizures.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches and seizures without a warrant violate this prohibition unless conducted pursuant to a few established exceptions. These exceptions include:

• Exigent circumstances (e.g., hot pursuit or emergency);
• Search incident to lawful arrest;
• Searches of automobiles supported by probable cause;
• Searches of items in “plain-view”; and
• Consent

Exclusionary Rule and Attenuation Doctrine

The “exclusionary rule” is the primary means of deterring violations of the Fourth Amendment. The exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence against the defendant if the evidence is obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Furthermore, it bars both primary evidence (i.e., evidence obtained as a direct of the illegal search) and derivative evidence (i.e., evidence later discovered as a result of the illegally obtained primary evidence). See United States v. Pacheco-Alvarez and Utah v. Strieff.

However, the exclusionary rule has a few exceptions, one of which is the attenuation doctrine. This doctrine provides that evidence is admissible “when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence obtained as a result is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance,” such that “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence.” See Strieff and Hudson v. Michigan.

Application of the attenuation doctrine requires the consideration of three factors:

• The “temporal proximity” between the unconstitutional search and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of the evidence followed the search;
• The presence of “intervening circumstances”; and
• The “purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” See Brown v. Illinois.

Court of Appeals Ruling

To begin, the 2^nd District Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the initial warrantless entry into Turpin’s residence was a violation of Turpin’s constitutional rights. For an arrest warrant to be sufficient to authorized entry into a person’s home, the police must have a reason to believe that the suspect lives in the residence AND the person must in fact be at the residence when the arrest warrant is executed.

Here, the officer had no reason to believe that the suspect in the vehicle theft (i.e., Delecce) resided at the Haverfield Road residence. In fact, the officer testified that the Haverfield address was not provided by dispatch as the residence of the vehicle theft suspect.

The State, in addition to ridiculously arguing that the initial entry into Turpin’s residence was constitutionally permissible, argued that the officer reasonably believed that someone was inside the home because a car was parked in the driveway and the side door to the residence was ajar. However, this argument completely misses the point.

It is insufficient for the officer to reasonably believe that “someone” was in the residence. The officer would have been justified in entering the residence only if he had a reasonably belief that Delecce not only resided at the residence, but was in fact present at that time.

In addition to the initial entry being unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals overruled the trial court and held that the attenuation doctrine does not apply. First, the officer discovered the evidence against Turpin immediately after his unconstitutional entry into Turpin’s residence. Second, the entirety of the officer’s unconstitutional entry was completed prior to the arrest warrant for Turpin being discovered. Thus, the discovery of the warrant was not an “intervening circumstance.” Finally, the officer’s flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment is just the sort of conduct that the exclusionary rule was designed to address.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals overruled and reversed the trial court’s denial of Turpin’s motion to suppress.

Columbus and Delaware, Ohio Criminal Defense Attorney

If you have been charged with a criminal offense in Columbus or Delaware, Ohio, contact Johnson Legal, LLC and speak with an experienced criminal defense attorney. Attorney David Johnson of Johnson Legal, LLC will discuss your case and assist you in fighting the charges. Call (614) 987-0192 or send an email to schedule a consultation regarding your criminal offense case.

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